• When a security lapse occurs, it is natural to ask what and why it happened and what do we do going forward to avoid future lapses. These appear to be straight-forward questions. But the answers cannot and should not be simplistic.

What & why it happened?

• I need not go into detail about the recent three cases. Ms Rajah and Dr Teo have pointed out that the common thread running through them was a failure to comply with SOPs. We acknowledge that.

• However, in considering these lapses, we should not oversimplify the issues. If we look at the three cases within their operating context, we can see that one type of mistake is not the same as another, even if the common thread is persons failing to comply with SOPs.

• For example, in the passport misclearance case, the officer’s focus was on security. He rightly conducted a face-to-face clearance when the automated gates failed. Terrorists are known to use real passports and in their own identities. Thus such an assessment is important in our counter terrorism security clearance system.

• The officer in question is quite experienced. He assessed Mr Ang by examining, if Mr Ang fit a terrorist or security-risk profile; whether he exhibited any suspicious behaviour cues or indicators; whether the passport tendered was tampered or a forgery.

• Up to that point, the officer did everything right. The officer however made a mistake in not pursuing Mr Ang’s failure to clear the automated gates. He was satisfied that Mr Ang was not a security risk, and assumed that it was just a technical glitch. He will be penalised for that error. But we must also be fair to the officer in question. He exercised most of the security protocols correctly, but made an error in not checking the passport against the boarding pass. To equate this case as the same as that of the Mas Selamat escape would be quite wrong.

• Why is this distinction important? I make it not to excuse any mistake or to trivialise one over another. But we need to highlight it because such a distinction is built into the design of all risk-based security systems.

• Security systems are designed to minimise not just failure but also to mitigate the magnitude of specific failures. This is inherent in any risk-based approach
to security. We have to prioritise our resources and focus according to the risks. More resources are focused on high risk, high-consequence areas and less resources in lower-risk, lower-consequence areas.

.• Will there be a misclearance case in future? More than 140 million travellers pass through our checkpoints annually. Five cases of persons carrying the wrong passports are detected every day by ICA officers. Can we guarantee that we will pick up all of these and that there will never be one which we might miss? While the Home Team will certainly work to avoid such an instance, it would be fool-hardy and unrealistic to assume this. What we can assure you is that we constantly work to minimise such lapses because we take them seriously. What we can assure you also is that the security system is layered and robust and is structured to minimise serious consequences.

What should be done going forward?

• We will certainly review lapses and seek to learn from them. We are doing so.

• Officers who make mistakes or who are liable must be taken to task. But we must also not over-react and be unfair to the officers. We have to ensure that in our judgement there will be fairness, a sense of proportion and justice, and adherence to established due processes.

• Dr Teo has spoken about the need for more discipline and more audits and more checks. Ms Rajah has made similar points. The question perhaps is really how much more is enough. We do regularly conduct audits and checks and they are important and useful. But these audits cannot prevent episodic individual failure to comply with established procedures. In respect of the lapses which have occurred, the systems and processes were found to be sound.

• So more checks and more compliance audits may not be the total solution. What we have done in MHA is to develop and implement a programme to test operational effectiveness. Since Jan 2007, there is in place a Red Teaming programme with the help of expert external consultants. This programme is designed to evaluate the actual level of competencies, alertness and vigilance of front-line security forces. Such tests help us identify operational blind-spots, weaknesses and the level and quality of vigilance of the front-line officer. The results allow us to then develop appropriate and practical interventions including special training for our front-line officers and their supervisors.

• But even such tests cannot stop the individual officer opening a gate without looking at his screen, nor can it help to prevent an officer failing to check the passport against the boarding pass. These as stated earlier are individual episodic lapses. They are not systemic practices.

Strict Compliance or Active Empowerment?

• I agree with Dr Teo Ho Pin and Ms Rajah that ground commanders and supervisors have a responsibility to ensure compliance by frontline officers with established procedures. However, in doing so, we want to also ensure that we do not dis-empower our front-line officers.

• Systems and SOPs are inherently dated. They are designed based on known experiences and scenarios. Just as we learn and improve, our adversaries, be they terrorists or criminals, learn and improve all the time as well. Ultimately when confronted with something new, we depend on the front line officer to meet such a challenge through his experience, judgement and initiative. How can we do this? One practical approach we have taken is to invest heavily on scenario-based, hands-on, front-liner training at the Home Team Academy. We want our officers to internalise knowledge and understand their SOPs rather than just comply blindly. We want them to develop good situational awareness and to cultivate good reflexes and instincts.

There is no 100% Security

• The reality is that no system can be completely fail-proof, either now or in the future. The aim must be to minimise failures and maximise success but also recognise that there will be failures and no absolute 100% success.

• For example, we have a zero tolerance philosophy for drug abuse and death penalties for drug trafficking. Our drug abuse and trafficking numbers are low but not zero. That does not mean CNB has failed or that our policy has failed.

• In 2007, ICA cleared some 143 million travellers through our land, sea and air checkpoints; or close to 400,000 travellers each day. With stepped-up security measures, ICA detected 37,800 cases of smuggling at the borders and more than 2,200 foreigners who attempted to enter Singapore fraudulently. Yet, we know that despite ICA’s best efforts, there will be some illegal immigrants and contraband smuggled into Singapore. To expect otherwise is completely unrealistic.

• So when Mr Siew Kum Hong made his points, I think he’s got to bear these perspectives in mind and not take all three cases together and lump them together and then say therefore there is a serious situation.

• Perfection is the ideal to aim for. But imperfection is the reality we have to work with each day. We face security challenges with incomplete, elliptical information of the evolving threat. Even so, we must act and make the best
judgement we can. Our officers must not be made to become risk-averse and avoid making judgements for fear of being wrong.

Is the Home Team over-stretched?

• Question has been raised if the Home Team is over-stretched. The core functions of the Home Team have not changed. But its volume and scope of work have greatly expanded, with increased population, tourist arrivals and more international events which require higher security coverage.

• We have a smaller Police force per 100,000 population when compared to Hong Kong and New York. But our crime rate per 100,000 population is lower than Hong Kong’s and three and a half times less than New York City’s.

• The new security landscape post-911 has raised significant demands on the Home Team. Unlike in the past, Singapore is today a target for terrorist groups.

• A fundamental question which MHA is exploring is whether we can continue to operate with the current level of resources. Our Home Team officers at the front-line are stretched and strained over a high alert that started since end 2001. The total number of overtime hours ICA ground officers at the checkpoints have to put in every month to cope with the volume of work varies between 23,000 to 28,000 OT hours.

• To consider the impact of this, the Ministry has directed that a human factor study be conducted. The study will look at issues of operational fatigue within the Home Team. The study will also look at resource and manning levels and see if there are sub-optimal areas which need urgent attention.

Look at Security in Perspective

• Security must always be viewed in its context. For instance, the Subordinate Courts is a place which the public must have free access given its critical function in the justice system. Any Police lock-up facility within the premises cannot undermine or compromise this function. We can enhance the lock-up security there. But it cannot be at the same level as Changi Prison.

• On the ground, security needs to find a balance between efficiency and expediency on the one hand, and effectiveness of security measures on the other. As much as we should maintain our security levels at our checkpoints, we also need to facilitate tourism, trade and social activities across borders.

• We need to look at security as always operating in a context where there are competing imperatives of economic, political and social interests. This is not a bad thing. Indeed a completely security-sealed country is one which will
suffocate enterprise and liberty. It is a cure worse than the disease it is trying to prevent.

• We need therefore to understand that security is not an absolute end. It is always achieved at a trade-off. And risks are always relative, to be managed, and not something we can eradicate completely in any human system operating in a living society. If we over simplify a complex subject like security design and operations, we may create unrealistic expectations of these systems and of the people who will man them. In the end, we only fool ourselves.

• The mistakes which have occurred recently cannot be dismissed. We should confront our mistakes, take ownership and take proper action to deal with them. But let us do so always with a sense of balance and on an informed basis, understanding the context and the complexity of the issues involved.

• Let me assure members of the House that the officers of the Home Team are committed to their work and mission and view the lapses which have occurred seriously. No one is more critical of these lapses than the officers and everyone at Home Team.

• Ultimately, we need to look at the generalised outcome of security in terms of the quality of life we have today. The real test of security must be whether there is a sense of safety, whether people can walk about freely and without fear that they would be robbed or assaulted and whether our police force is trusted, and generally free of corruption and nexus with the underworld. On the score-card whether for crime, drugs or terrorism or for neutralising hazards or even in rehabilitating prisoners to give them a second chance, any objective and honest assessment will conclude that the officers of the Home Team have done a good job compared to their counterparts in other parts of the world, despite the difficult operating environment they face everyday.


FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Question 1: Is there an overall lack of security consciousness in the Home Team? Is our security weakened?

Answer:

Internal surveys and Red Teaming exercises show that by and large, the Home Team officers have a high security consciousness. They are keenly aware of the responsibility that they bear in ensuring the safety and security of Singapore. Their level of vigilance on the job is generally high but we have to be careful that increasing work-load and stress levels do not impair their effectiveness over time. A human factor study is being pursued by MHA to investigate this.

2. Our statistics for instance on the detection of breaches and the handling of persons in custody also indicate that the track record of the Home Team officers responsible for managing these functions remains good. For instance, the Immigration & Checkpoints Authority detected 37,800 cases of smuggling at the borders. That is equivalent to about 104 smuggling cases detected every day, in addition to clearing over 390,000 travellers daily through our land, sea and air checkpoints.

3. A high level of security consciousness is not enough. We need to also ensure that the front-line officer has the right competencies and know what to do in any operational situation or contingency which he may face in the course of his work. The challenge is that the threat and its forms are constantly evolving and we need to not only establish these early enough through intelligence and research, we also need to devise operational methods to counter them.

4. Red Teaming exercises help to establish such knowledge or competency deficits or gaps which an officer on the ground may face. Hands-on scenario based training at the Home Team Academy have been developed and the Academy has built and will continue to invest in building such facilities. Such training helps to equip our front-liners with the right competencies and reflexes.

5. Even with the best of efforts, we know that our security and safety cannot be taken for granted. This is why we view infractions by Home Team officers very seriously, and learn from each and every incident. This is also why we have been constantly working to prepare for the day when a terrorist incident does occur.

6. Our approach to security cannot be one-dimensional – we must work to prevent a terrorist incident and at the same time, work also to always prepare to deal with the consequences of an incident. Hence, the Home Team, especially SCDF, commit significant resources in developing capabilities to deal with all types of catastrophic incidents. Hence, PM also launched the Community Engagement Programme to develop social resilience and preparedness to deal with the impact especially on communal relations that a terrorist incident can provoke.

Question 2: Do the security lapses amount to systemic weakness or failure across the Home Team? Are Home Team officers complacent and allowing security lapses to occur?

Answer:

The attempted escape at the Subordinate Courts and the passport mis-clearance at the Budget Terminal are two lapses resulting from the poor judgement or lack of alertness of individual officers. They are not indications of any widespread systemic indiscipline or a culture of complacency among the Home Team officers.

2. These two lapses must be viewed in perspective against the overall workload and their contexts. There were two attempted escapees from the Subordinate Courts out of nearly 25,000 persons in custody brought to the Courts in the first six months of 2008. The custodial arrangements in the Subordinate Courts cannot be the same as the level we have in Changi Prison where there has been no escape for decades. There was one passport mis-clearance when nearly 390,000 travellers pass through our land, sea and air checkpoints daily. Historically, we know that such misclearance occurs from time to time even as 5 cases of persons using the wrong passports are detected every day at the checkpoints. While every lapse or failure must be addressed, these statistics do suggest that Home Team officers are generally vigilant and alert, and the custody system is generally sound.

3. Nevertheless, the Home Team views all security lapses seriously, and will in all cases review what went wrong and take corrective measures to minimise the risk of a recurrence. This is also why appropriate action will always be taken against all officers involved in a lapse, with the disciplinary action taken carefully calibrated against the seriousness of the lapse on their part.

4. The Home Team continues to do well in fighting crime, preventing security incidents, and keeping our borders safe and secure. However, incidents can and will occur from time to time. The Home Team adopts a risk based approach. As our resources are finite, we place more resources to minimise the risk of major security incidents with more serious or catastrophic consequences.

5. Operational fatigue and a resource crunch are factors which are being studied at the moment. The security threat has grown significantly since 9/11. So too has the Home Team’s workload. For instance, the Home Team has to prevent crime and carry out investigations and enforcement actions within a much larger population, conduct immigration checks and passport clearance on a growing number of travellers into Singapore, and ensure safety and security for many more mega events held in Singapore each year. MHA is exploring whether we can continue to maintain our existing efficiency and effectiveness with the current level of resources.

Question 3: How useful and effective are the operational audits in preventing future lapses? Why not increase security audits and enhance compliance protocols to ensure that all Home Team officers observe Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) strictly?

Answer:

In the Home Team, we conduct frequent exercises and use scenarios to simulate situations that our officers may not encounter on a daily basis. These are intended to raise the alertness and vigilance of our Home Team officers and to condition them to be able to respond flexibly to changes in the operating environment.

2. Regular operational audits are also useful to help us identify vulnerabilities and operational gaps in our system. It is human nature that if a person has been doing a job for a long time and has not encountered any potential security threat, say, a terrorist, he is not likely to expect a terrorist. Operational audits help to guard against this mindset.

3. However, we must be careful that our officers do not feel over-stretched and over-strained by constant operational audits. Compliance with SOPs is useful to the extent that they help officers to prevent errors within the parameters defined by the SOPs. But unlike a manufacturing process, our officers operate under highly variable and often challenging circumstances and conditions, and will inevitably encounter situations not fully covered by the SOPs. Hence, SOPs cannot be over-rigid and stifle our officers’ ability to think on their feet, and exercise good judgement and initiative.

4. Apart from audits, the Home Team is also exploring how we can leverage on the pool of non-security stakeholders at the airport to help spot suspicious behaviour and signs. This is similar to the behaviour detection approach that the US Department of Homeland Security has been employing at US airports. Tapping on the networks of the wider community in an environment is not new to us. Indeed, this is what we have been encouraging all along when we urge the public and the community to stay vigilant and work hand-in-hand with the Home Team to keep our environment safe and secure.

Question 4: Is ICA responsible for checking that travellers use correct travel documents? In the latest airport incident, is ICA responsible for cross-checking the boarding pass and passport?

Answer:

When Mr Ang failed to clear the automated clearance channel, the ICA officer in question correctly proceeded to vet and clear him manually. He focused on behavioural profiling and whether the passport belonged to a wanted criminal or terrorist. He wrongly assumed that the automated clearance system merely could not read the biometric data in the passport and that it was a technical glitch. He cleared Mr Ang as he was satisfied that he was neither a security risk nor a crime risk.

2. The ICA officer should have checked the boarding pass and passport. He failed to do so. Regardless of whether there are other persons who should have checked the passport against the boarding pass, there is no avoiding the fact that the ICA officer should have done it.

3. There are requirements for checks to be done by various officers at various stages of the process from check-in to boarding the plane. The ticketing officer at Changi Airport’s Budget Terminal should have verified the identity of Mr Ang with his passport as part of the procedures to issue a boarding pass which obviously has to be to the right person as represented in the document. Likewise, the Swissport staff at the boarding gate should do the same before allowing Mr Ang to board the flight.

4. MHA is undertaking a holistic review of the clearance procedures and arrangements at the airport. At the same time, SPF and ICA have conducted security briefings to the airport community on the required security process. They have also stepped up Red Teaming exercises to ensure adequate vigilance and alertness on the part of all involved.

5. In the past, the Auxillary Police Officer at the gate conducted a check of passport against boarding pass before allowing the traveller to enter the Immigration Clearance Zone. However in 2003, arising from concerns and complaints that this led to a congestion at the area, this requirement was changed and the officer merely check to ensure that the person has a valid boarding pass to allow him to enter. This protocol is now currently being reviewed.

6. The volume of travellers at Changi Airport has increased sharply by 32% from 2004 to 2007. Our security personnel must strike a balance to meet the ever increasing demand for efficiency in the level of service and clearance time without compromising the level of security checks that we are expected to uphold. The right and optimum balance is a negotiated judgement which needs to be arrived at by the various stakeholders representing different legitimate interests, one of which is security.

Question 5: What is the status of MHA’s review on Home Team Departments’ security systems and processes that was directed by the Minister for Home Affairs?

Answer:

MHA is currently undertaking a stock-take of critical operational areas. This is to determine that there are SOPs covering these areas, that these SOPs are sound, and that the Home Team officers are properly trained and undertake their duties in these areas in line with the SOPs. The stock take is also intended to determine if there are any potential vulnerabilities or gaps and if so, to ensure that all necessary additional measures are taken within a reasonable timeframe to close these gaps and minimise the risks of major security lapses.

2. Once this stock take is completed, operational audits will continue on a regular basis. The aim is to ensure that all related systems, processes and procedures remain relevant and minimise the risks of future security lapses.


Question 6: Are there any indicators that show how well our Home Team has fared when compared to security agencies in other countries?

Answer:

On the scorecard for crime rate, Singapore compares favourably with other countries. In 2007, Singapore’s crime rate (per 100,000 population) is 1.7 times lower than Hong Kong, and about 3.5 times lower than that of New York. This was achieved with a comparatively smaller number of police officers. Singapore’s police officers ratio (per 100,000 population) is 1.6 times lower than Hong Kong and 1.8 times lower than that of New York (see also Annex A for figures on police officers ratio).

2. In terms of non-crime indicators such as fire fatality, Singapore also compares favourably. Singapore’s fire fatality rate (per 100,000 population) is lower than that of major cities like Tokyo, New York, London and Hong Kong in 2007. Yet, we have a much smaller fire personnel (per 100,000 population) than many of these cities.


ANNEX A

NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICERS PER 100,000 POPULATION

City Number of police officers per 100,000 population
Year & Source of Data
Singapore Police Force
239 Source for Police Figures – SPF (2007)

Source for Population Figures (2007)
http://www.singstat.gov.sg

This figure includes uniformed / sworn Police Officers and SPF Full-time NSmen. It excludes civilian staff and Operationally Ready NSmen (i.e. reservists).

Hong Kong Police
393 Source for Police Figures (2007)
http://www.police.gov.hk/hkp-home/english/history/history_01.htm

Source for Population Figures (2007)
http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/statistics_by_subject/index_t.jsp

New York Police Department
430 Source for Police Figures - New York Police Department (2007)

Source for Population Figures (2006)
http://home2.nyc.gov.html/dcp/html/census/popdiv.shtml